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The relationship between CO2 intensity and GDP per capita is studied. Most rich countries show 
falling CO2 intensity over time and a negative correlation with GDP per capita. Many poor and 
medium rich countries show the opposite, a positive time trend and a positive correlation with GDP 
per capita. For the majority of countries with a negative correlation between CO2 intensity and GDP 
per capita a non-linear function fits the data better than a linear one, implying that CO2 intensity falls 
at a diminishing rate as countries get richer. Hence, economic growth will not by itself go very far in 
reconciling economic growth and reductions in CO2 emissions. There are indications that poor and 
medium rich countries experience a boost in CO2 intensity as they embark on industrialization. This 
will also make it harder to reconcile economic growth and cuts in CO2 emissions. 
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Is economic growth compatible with reduction in carbon dioxide emissions? If so, carbon dioxide 
emissions per unit of GDP (hereafter CO2 intensity) will have to fall. New technologies for energy 
production on a grand scale are likely to be necessary for this, but it would also help if there are 
structural trends accompanying economic growth that would bring the CO2 intensity down. This is not 
unlikely, as economic growth is accompanied by disproportionate growth of services, which are less 
energy intensive than material production (Medlock and Soligo, 2001). 
What is the historical record? As part of its battery of world economic indicators, the World Bank 
publishes carbon dioxide content per unit of GDP at fixed prices for most countries in the world. In 
this paper we use this data to investigate the historical record across countries and, in particular, how 
CO2 intensity is related to GDP per capita. We get mixed results, but yet a tendency that the CO2 
intensity falls as countries get richer. 
According to the BP Statistical Review of World Energy, more than 80 percent of primary commercial 
energy still comes from fossil fuels. Since most CO2 emissions are caused by burning fossil fuels, 
what has happened to CO2 intensity is in large measure a reflection of what has happened to energy 
intensity. Many papers on that subject have been published, and most indicate that energy intensity 
falls as GDP per capita increases, or that the relationship has an inverted U-shape. Csereklyei, Rubio-
Varas and Stern (2016) find, for a sample of 99 countries, that energy intensity falls as countries grow 
richer, but point out that energy intensity may increase in countries experiencing no growth. They also 
point out that the increasing energy intensity often observed for poor countries could be due to a 
transition from non-commercial biomass energy to commercial energy. They include non-commercial 
energy in their data, but recognize the unreliability of such data. Most other studies use only 
commercial energy. Medlock and Soligo (2001) find the inverted U-shape for intensity of commercial 
energy, for a panel of 28 countries. 
In a recent paper, Semieniuk (2018) investigates the “green growth hypothesis”, that is, whether a 
faster development in productivity will reduce the energy intensity of the economy. Using a large but 
unbalanced panel—180 countries 1950-2014—he finds that faster growth is not greener; a higher rate 
of labor productivity growth is typically associated with a higher rate of growth of energy input per 
unit of labor, canceling the effect on energy intensity. Hence, faster productivity growth will not 
contribute to reconciling economic growth and reduction in CO2 emissions. 
Two papers study the relationship between CO2 emissions and GDP. Bella, Massidda and Mattana 
(2014) study the relationship between total CO2 emissions and total GDP for a panel of 22 OECD-
countries. They find an inverted U-shape for most countries, which most likely implies a similar shape 
as well for CO2 intensity and GDP per capita, as for most countries GDP and GDP per capita have 
moved in the same direction. Jakob et al. (2012) study the growth of CO2 emissions and GDP for a 
sample of 51 countries. They break their sample into developing and industrialized countries and find 
that both grew at a rate higher than average in developing countries while there is no significant 
relationship between the growth rates of GDP and the use of energy for developed countries. These 
results are not directly comparable to ours, but neither do they contradict them. 
Looking at the relationship between CO2 intensity, or energy intensity, and GDP per capita implies 
that a structural change in GDP as countries grow richer is seen as a driver of changes in CO2 
emissions or energy use. A rationale has already been advanced; as countries get richer, more and 
more of presumably less energy intensive services is produced and CO2 intensity falls, while in 
countries just beginning their industrialization the opposite might happen. But things are more 
complicated than that. Energy or CO2 intensity might fall with no change in GDP per capita because of 
technological progress leading to increased energy efficiency across economic sectors or a transition 
from fossil fuels to other energy sources, or even between different fossil fuels (such as less reliance 
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on coal and greater use of natural gas). Two studies of the US economy try to tease out how much of 
energy savings is due to increased energy efficiency (better technology) and how much is due to 
structural changes following changes in GDP per capita. Metcalf (2008) found that most of the 
reduction in energy intensity is due to improvements in energy efficiency while Huntington (2010) 
came to the opposite result. As pointed out by Huntington, the difference could be due to the degree of 
disaggregation in the data. So, to analyze this question, one needs not only country-specific 
disaggregated data, but the level of aggregation could have a critical bearing on the answer. 
There are more devils in the details. In a recent paper, Croner and Francovic (2018) study structural 
versus efficiency factors behind changes in energy intensity, using detailed input-output coefficients 
for a number of countries. They point out that production-based data give more importance to 
structural factors than consumption-based data would do, because rich countries have to a large extent 
outsourced the production of CO2-intensive goods to developing countries, a point also made by Dieter 
Helm (2012) with the British economy as an example. This present study uses GDP data at a country 
level and makes no pretense at distinguishing between structural and technological factors behind 
changes in CO2 intensity. That said, looking at the relationship between CO2 intensity and GDP per 
capita at the country level is interesting in its own right and a first approximation to what is going on. 
The time trend 
Figure 1 shows the development of the CO2 intensity world wide, for real GDP measured in 2010 US 
dollars. The CO2 intensity fell steadily from 1960 to 2000 and stagnated after that. This is curious, as 
efforts to develop green energy and otherwise reduce carbon dioxide emissions have been particularly 
strong after 2000. When China is removed from the sample of nations the stagnation disappears. 
Nevertheless, the CO2 intensity has fallen more slowly for the world excluding China in this century 
than it did before, so we still face the paradox why efforts at decarbonization have achieved so little 
since they appeared on the world agenda. 
 
Figure 1: World CO2 emissions (kg per 2010 US$ of GDP) 1960-2014 with and without China. Data from the 
World Bank. 
What is the time trend across countries? Table A1 in the Appendix shows which countries had a 
significant (at the 5% level) time trend for CO2 intensity 1960-2014 (not all countries are represented 
for the entire period). Most countries with a GDP per capita of more than 23,000 dollars, and there are 
36 of them, have a negative time trend, but for five the trend coefficient is insignificant. Below 23,000 
dollars of GDP per capita a significantly positive time trend begins to show up, and then we are down 
















Greece, Portugal and Saudi Arabia. For the remaining 154 countries, which may be characterized as 
medium rich or poor, we get a significantly positive time trend for about a half (69), while for 58 we 
get a significantly negative time trend, and for 28 we get no significant trend at all. The CO2 intensity 
has thus tended to rise rather than fall for medium rich and poor countries, contrary to what has 
happened in rich countries. 
CO2 intensity and GDP per capita 
One reason why the CO2 intensity has been falling over time in many countries is that GDP per capita 
has been increasing. If CO2 intensity falls as GDP per capita increases, for reasons already mentioned, 
this will show up as a falling time trend of CO2 intensity. We now turn to investigating the relationship 
between CO2 intensity and GDP per capita. We focus attention on countries with a negative 
relationship between these two and specify three models, a linear model, a second degree equation, 
and a power equation, as follows: 
 y a bx    
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where y is CO2 intensity and x is GDP per capita. The coefficients are estimated with linear regression, 
with the last equation on logarithmic form. We retain the model with the largest explanatory power 
(R2) and significant coefficients. 
The results are summarized in Table A1. We get a significantly negative correlation between CO2 
intensity and GDP per capita for 93 countries, slightly more than show a significantly negative time 
trend (88). The countries with a negative time trend and a negative correlation with GDP per capita are 
mostly the same. For only 47 do we get a positive correlation between CO2 intensity and GDP per 
capita, far fewer than those which show a significantly positive time trend (69), so there are more 
countries with no significant correlation between CO2 intensity and GDP per capita (50) than those 
with an insignificant time trend (33). 
For the majority of countries where CO2 intensity falls as GDP per capita increases a non-linear 
relationship is a better description than a linear one (57 of 93), implying less and less decline in CO2 
intensity as GDP per capita increases further (the type of function is reported in Table A1). This is a 
potential explanation of why the CO2 intensity has fallen more slowly after 2000; many enough 
countries may have reached the level of GDP per capita where further gains in declining CO2 intensity 
are small. While many countries are still so poor that they are unlikely to have reached that level, what 
happens in rich countries, which are responsible for most CO2 emissions, may be decisive. 
An illustration 
It would require too much space to illustrate the modeling results for all countries, but it is of interest 
to compare our modeling results with the actual development in the largest economies of the world. 
After all these countries have, by their sheer size, most effect on world GDP and also on world 
emissions of CO2, even if the CO2 intensity of GDP varies considerably between countries (the CO2 
intensity of China’s GDP is about four times that of the United States). Figure 2 shows the 
development of the CO2 intensity for the eight countries with the highest total GDP in 2014 and 
compares it with our modeling results. The model reproduces the actual development in the United 
States, Germany, France and the United Kingdom quite well (note that we only have data from 
Germany after 1991). For three of these our best model is non-linear, while for France it is linear. The 
result is less good for China; in that country the CO2 intensity shows a rickety ride, with a rapid fall in 
the 1960s, then a rise, and a fall again from the late 1970s. Our best model, which is non-linear, makes 
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a certain sense from that time on. Likewise the results for Japan are mixed. The CO2 intensity of the 
Japanese GDP increased to the mid-1970s and has fallen thereafter. If we estimate our model with data 
from 1974 on the model captures the actual development quite well. That 1974 is a watershed is 
probably not a coincidence; this was the time of the first energy crisis. It may also be explained by 
Japan emerging from a period of rapid economic growth and industrialization implying possibly a 
rising CO2 intensity of GDP. An argument against this being valid in general is the fall in the Chinese 
CO2 intensity after the late 1970s, which coincided with rapid economic growth and industrialization. 
Lastly there are Brazil and India. In Brazil the CO2 intensity has fluctuated without trend, and in India 
it rose until the early 1990s, but has fallen since. The model simulations shown in the diagrams for 
these countries explain very little or nothing of what has happened. 
The results for Japan, Brazil and India suggest that there may be a phase in the development of poor 
and medium rich countries where the CO2 intensity of GDP increases with GDP per capita, in order to 
fuel rapid industrialization. Figure 3 shows the CO2 intensity and the GDP per capita in two countries, 
Singapore and Thailand, that have experienced rapid economic growth. Singapore appears to have had 
a phase of increasing and then high CO2 intensity during its first phase of rapid development up until 
about 1980. After that the CO2 intensity has fallen rather evenly, but seems recently to have reached a 










































































































































































Figure 2: Actual and simulated CO2 intensity (kg per dollar GDP) in the six largest economies of the world. 
  
Figure 3: CO2 intensity (left axis) and GDP per capita (right axis) in Singapore and Thailand. 
 
Does CO2 intensity fall at a diminishing rate? 
For the majority of countries, CO2 intensity appears to fall as they get richer, and for these the 
relationship is non-linear in the majority of cases, implying that the CO2 intensity falls at a 
diminishing rate. This is supported by estimating the second degree equation for the entire panel of 




































































































































































































































































































































Results from estimating the equation 
2
1 2y a b x b x    , with t-values in parentheses. 









The estimated curve is shown in Figure 4, together with the CO2 intensity in select countries, adjusted 
to the level of the United States, which is used as base for the dummies. The data for Thailand, the 
United States, the United Kingdom and Singapore were shown in Figures 2 and 3 and commented on 
in the previous section. Thailand and Singapore do not follow this overall tendency at all in their early 
phase. Data for the three richest countries in the world in 2014, Luxembourg, Norway and 
Switzerland, are also shown. The CO2 intensity for the latter two is fairly flat. The CO2 intensity for 
Luxembourg falls rapidly in the beginning, but is fairly flat in later years. Luxembourg is an example 
of a country that has developed rapidly towards a service-based, wealthy economy. 
It could be argued that the results in Table 1 are biased because we have an unbalanced panel. For 
many countries data are not reported for the early years; there is a large influx of countries in the early 
1990s, associated with the downfall of the Soviet Union and the disappearance of the iron curtain. 
Estimating the equation for data from 1992 onwards still gives significant coefficients with the same 
sign, but their numerical values now produce a U-shaped curve with a minimum at a GDP per capita 
of about 70,000 dollars. It is unlikely that the CO2 intensity will begin to increase again at higher GDP 
levels, so we take this as a further evidence that the CO2 intensity does indeed fall with GDP per 
capita, but at a diminishing rate. 
 
 
Figure 4: The equation 
2
1 2y a b x b x   (y = CO2 intensity, x = GDP per capita), as estimated for the entire 

































A falling CO2 intensity as GDP per capita grows would contribute to reconciling economic growth and 
reduction in CO2 emissions. But there is considerable evidence that this is primarily the case in rich 
countries and that the effect becomes smaller and smaller as countries get still richer. This will 
increase the burden on alternative technologies to deal with emissions. Furthermore, the need for 
alternative technologies will increase if the poor and medium rich countries of the world must go 
through a phase of increased energy use as they grow out of poverty. Hence, reconciling economic 
growth and reduction in CO2 emissions would seem to depend critically on the development of energy 
sources other than fossil fuels. Economic growth by itself will not sweep this problem away. 
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Countries in the sample, their GDP per capita (2010 us dollars in 2014), whether CO2 intensity has a significant 
time trend, whether CO2 intensity is correlated with GDP per capita, and what type of model best fits the 
relationship between CO2 intensity and GDP per capita. 
  Time trend Correlation w GDP/cap  
 GDPcap Pos Neg Ins Pos Neg Ins Model 
Luxembourg 107152.9  x   x  Power 
Norway 89274.96  x   x  Linear 
Bermuda 79251.78  x    x  
Switzerland 76410.86  x   x  Linear 
Macao 69749.16  x   x  2nd degree 
Qatar 67901.22  x   x  2nd degree 
Denmark 59437.93  x   x  Linear 
Australia 54546.2  x   x  Linear 
Ireland 54052.95  x   x  2nd degree 
Sweden 53561.89  x   x  Power 
Singapore 52244.44  x   x  Linear 
United States 50871.67  x   x  2nd degree 
Netherlands 50497.24  x   x  Linear 
Canada 50221.84  x   x  Linear 
Austria 47922.34  x   x  2nd degree 
Japan 46484.16  x   x  Linear 
Greenland 46443.76  x   x  2nd degree 
Finland 45239.37  x   x  Linear 
Germany 45022.57  x   x  2nd degree 
Iceland 44775.64  x   x  2nd degree 
Belgium 44676.66  x   x  2nd degree 
France 41374.76  x   x  Linear 
United Kingdom 40908.75  x   x  2nd degree 
Andorra 40785.05  x   x  Power 
United Arab Emirates 39146.11   x  x  2nd degree 
Kuwait 36259.67   x  x  Power 
New Zealand 36142.52   x  x  Linear 
Hong Kong 35717.68  x   x  Linear 
Italy 33615.97  x   x  Linear 
Brunei 33313.83   x   x  
Israel 32661.29  x   x  Linear 
Spain 29496.38   x   x  
Bahamas 27246.48  x   x  Power 
S Korea 24323.57  x   x  Linear 
Malta 23676.03  x   x  Power 
Slovenia 23224.4  x   x  2nd degree 
Greece 22565.68 x   x    
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Bahrain 22390.68  x   x  2nd degree 
Portugal 21533.49 x   x    
Saudi Arabia 21183.46 x    x  Linear 
Czech Republic 20343.68  x   x  2nd degree 
Cyprus 20009.06  x   x  2nd degree 
Slovak Republic 18003.54  x   x  Power 
Estonia 17453.37  x   x  2nd degree 
Oman 17167.05 x   x    
Trinidad and Tobago 16641.74 x   x    
Equatorial Guinea 16028.25   x   x  
Barbados 15901.9 x   x    
St. Kitts and Nevis 15029.62 x   x    
Lithuania 14935.54  x   x  Power 
Chile 14681.33  x   x  Power 
Hungary 14119.07  x   x  2nd degree 
Poland 14090.62  x   x  Power 
Uruguay 13856.7  x   x  2nd degree 
Latvia 13758.96  x   x  Power 
Venezuela 13709.04 x    x  2nd degree 
Croatia 13651.99  x   x  Linear 
Turkey 13312.46 x   x    
Seychelles 12850.49 x   x    
Antigua and Barbuda 12403.53  x   x  2nd degree 
Brazil 11870.15   x   x 2nd degree 
Russia 11865.03  x   x  Power 
Kazakhstan 10646.03  x   x  Power 
Malaysia 10398.23 x   x    
Panama 10350.4  x   x  Power 
Argentina 10323.21   x  x  Linear 
Palau 9692.272   x  x  Power 
Mexico 9536.6 x   x    
Gabon 9508.285   x x    
Romania 9227.437  x   x  Power 
Caribbean small states 9169.713 x   x    
Mauritius 9163.633 x   x    
Costa Rica 9065.026 x   x    
Suriname 8942.961  x   x  2nd degree 
St. Lucia 8147.524 x   x    
Maldives 8124.708 x   x    
Grenada 7932.668 x   x    
South Africa 7582.553 x     x  
Botswana 7574.282   x   x  
Lebanon 7447.364  x   x  Linear 
Bulgaria 7299.549  x   x  Power 
Colombia 7291.692  x   x  2nd degree 
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Montenegro 7045.116   x   x  
Dominica 6951.032 x   x    
Libya 6697.103   x  x  2nd degree 
Belarus 6664.097  x   x  Power 
St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines 
6467.158 x   x    
Turkmenistan 6399.271  x   x  Power 
Dominican Republic 6203.726 x     x  
Cuba 6182.774  x   x  Power 
Iran 6161.104 x     x  
Azerbaijan 6122.98  x   x  Power 
China 6108.239  x   x  Power 
Namibia 5901.243   x   x  
Peru 5825.198   x   x  
Serbia 5593.061  x   x  Linear 
Thailand 5591.106 x   x    
Ecuador 5428.714 x   x    
Iraq 5253.627  x   x  2nd degree 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 4992.949 x   x    
Macedonia 4920.216  x   x  Linear 
Jamaica 4714.861   x   x  
Algeria 4675.885 x   x    
Albania 4413.562  x   x  Linear 
Belize 4411.856  x   x  Linear 
Tunisia 4271.327   x   x  
Fiji 4084.2  x    x  
Swaziland 3980.774  x    x 2nd degree 
Mongolia 3901.867  x    x  
Georgia 3851.723  x    x   
Armenia 3827.343  x   x  Power 
Paraguay 3761.912 x   x    
Angola 3746.66 x     x  
Indonesia 3692.943 x   x    
Guyana 3595.925  x   x  Linear 
Tonga 3581.837 x   x    
Samoa 3524.596  x   x  2nd degree 
Sri Lanka 3506.871  x   x  2nd degree 
Cabo Verde 3369.643   x   x  
Jordan 3348.827 x     x  
Marshall Islands 3333.361 x   x    
El Salvador 3272.74 x   x    
Tuvalu 3196.979   x   x  
Morocco 3160.526 x   x    
Pacific island small states 3116.11  x   x  Power 
Guatemala 3007.9 x   x    
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Ukraine 2967.213  x   x  2nd degree 
Congo, Rep. 2922.973   x   x  
Vanuatu 2909.775  x    x  
Micronesia 2716.323 x     x  
Egypt 2608.375   x   x  
Nigeria 2563.092   x   x  
Timor-Leste 2547.159   x  x  Linear 
West Bank and Gaza 2529.996 x     x  
Philippines 2505.819   x   x  
Bhutan 2500.26 x     x  
Papua New Guinea 2329.891 x    x   
Bolivia 2317.257 x    x   
Honduras 2059.475 x    x   
Moldova 1986.941  x   x  Power 
Sudan 1837.138  x    x  
Nicaragua 1812.995 x    x  2nd degree 
Uzbekistan 1744.491  x   x  2nd degree 
Ghana 1659.797 x     x  
India 1645.326 x     x  
Zambia 1620.823  x  x    
Kiribati 1565.243 x    x  Power 
Vietnam 1565.02 x   x    
Solomon Islands 1475.528   x  x  Power 
Laos 1470.5 x   x    
Cameroon 1428.216 x   x    
Cote d'Ivoire 1384.91 x     x  
Mauritania 1326.159 x     x  
Lesotho 1323.238  x   x  2nd degree 
Myanmar 1266.124  x   x  Power 
Sao Tome and Principe 1241.459   x   x  
Pakistan 1111.196   x   x  
Yemen 1101.117 x   x    
Kenya 1075.659  x   x  2nd degree 
Senegal 1018.393 x    x  Linear 
Kyrgyzstan 1003.51  x    x  
Cambodia 972.9792   x   x  
Chad 967.1028   x   x  
Zimbabwe 939.7803  x    x  
Bangladesh 922.1611 x    x    
Tajikistan 892.64  x    x  
Benin 833.6409 x   x    
Tanzania 782.6772 x   x    
Comoros 779.8398 x    x  Power 
Haiti 728.7803 x    x  Power 
Guinea 714.1633   x   x  
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Mali 705.7885   x   x  
Nepal 675.7353 x   x    
Rwanda 672.6396 x     x  
Uganda 642.8774 x   x    
Burkina Faso 639.7096 x   x    
Sierra Leone 562.8597  x    x  
Guinea-Bissau 545.8985   x   x  
Togo 531.1561 x     x  
Gambia 530.3189 x   x    
Eritrea 514.1796  x    x  
Mozambique 493.2533  x   x  Power 
Malawi 484.3686  x   x  Power 
Ethiopia 452.7782   x   x  
Madagascar 408.661 x    x  Power 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 397.582  x  x    
Niger 386.7258 x    x  Power 
Liberia 376.5889 x    x  2nd degree 
Central African Republic 302.5465 x    x  2nd degree 
Burundi 243.1019 x   x    
Total  69 88 33 47 93 50  
 
